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Pick a federal habeas corpus opinion at random, and it is likely to describe the writ
reverentially - as a durable check on majorities, as a snow-driven-pure monument to
freedom, or with some other gauzy reference to liberty's march through history. If the
"Great Writ" had a seamy underbelly, then it had never been probed by modem habeas
decisions in the U.S. Reporter. 1 Three recent books from varied academic disciplines,
however, demonstrate that habeas is as much about power as it is about liberty - the
power of some judges over other magistrates, the power of the judiciary over coordinate
governing institutions, and the power of dominant political coalitions over the
opposition. With respect to habeas corpus, liberty may be power's footnote, not the other
way around.
In Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire, History Professor Paul Halliday
produces the definitive account of the pre-Revolutionary English writ, the vehicle by
which King's Bench transformed its power over custodians into power to decide the
merits of custody's cause - and, by extension, the terms of the Crown's empire.2 In
Habeas Corpus in America: The Politics ofIndividual Rights, Political Science Professor
Justin Wert hops the pond and presents the American writ as a tool that dominant
political coalitions have used to enforce their conceptions of constitutional governance. 3
In Habeas for the Twenty-First Century: Uses, Abuses, and the Future of the Great Writ,
Law Professors Nancy King and Joseph Hoffmann present an unflinching, data-driven
account of how modem habeas has failed to protect its purported goal, liberty, in most
* Assistant Professor, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.
1. This circumstance changed markedly in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S 723 (2008), in which the Court
encountered much of the source material for Paul Halliday's book for the first time. See id. at 740, 747, 752
(citing Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and
American Implications, 94 VA. L. REv. 575 (2008)).
2. PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010).
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criminal proceedings.4
At the outset, I cop to being selective in the source material that this brief
"Review" discusses, if only because I use much of my allotted space to make two
source-derivative points about (1) the methodological pitfalls of lawyers mining legal
opinions for history and (2) how this problem has terrifically screwed up our modem
understanding of the habeas writ and its limitations. I hope my discussion nonetheless
shows potential readers that each of these books deserves a read both on its own
disciplinary merit and as an entry in a larger, more ambitious discussion about how
habeas constructs and reflects institutional power.
THE ENGLISH WRIT OF POWER
University of Virginia History Professor Paul Halliday takes the squarest aim at the
problematic methodology behind the "Whiggish" habeas narrative: 5 "If we [read Coke &
Blackstone] while countless parchment court records and case reports surviving only in
manuscript lie unread in archives, then we have been derelict as historians. If we act
upon such claims in our courts, we may be derelict in our jurisprudence . . . ." The
centerpiece of his work is a 2,757-document sample of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum
writs from every fourth year between 1502 and 1798 - data about what English judges
actually used habeas to do. 7 In less than two years since its publication, Professor
Halliday's work has secured a status as the definitive historical account of the pre-
Revolutionary writ. That stature reflects a consensus shared by courts, lawyers, and
academics, and it is one that I join.8
To put Professor Halliday's basic insight pithily: at the American Founding,
habeas was the most important source of judicial power making its way across the
Atlantic, and the boundaries of that power were not always (or even frequently) set
pursuant to a substantive conception of liberty. Habeas was a muscular writ that judges
sent to all kinds of custodians, for any reason and to any place, to test the lawfulness of
any detention. There were no "jurisdictional" limitations in a government without a
written constitution; judges sent the writ to recipients that could be forced to honor it.
Professor Halliday's history contains many bitter-pill propositions for a legal culture that
is both engorged with "originalist" constitutional interpretation and skeptical of
structural principles that do not aggressively cabin judicial discretion.
As Professor Halliday eloquently puts it, the defining attribute of pre-
Revolutionary habeas was not how judges decided cases, but that judges decided them. 9
Until the end of the eighteenth century, the "jurisdiction" of English courts was
splintered and lacking in familiar modem hierarchies. Different types of tribunals or
4. NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: USES, ABUSES,
AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT (2011).
5. I use the term "Whiggish" to describe the cluster of sanitized habeas narratives that present the writ as a
procedure tending, inexorably and at every turn, towards liberty of the British subject or American citizen.
6. HALLIDAY, supra note 2, at 3-4.
7. Id. at 462-73 (presenting data in chart form).
8. See supra note 1 (collecting Supreme Court references to Halliday's work); Stephen I. Vladeck, The
New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARv. L. REv. 941 (2011) (analyzing what Halliday's research means for
modem Suspension Clause law).
9. See HALLIDAY, supra note 2 , at 7.
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magistrates had different powers over different territories. Professor Halliday shows us
how King's Bench used habeas to exert authority - to "make and order" jurisdiction -
over all of these other judicial and custodial entities.10 Habeas encoded King's Bench
into the DNA of English Government. The justices issued writs to custodians that would
comply, and the Bench transformed its power to review detention into a power to decide
legal questions affecting custody.
The anachronistic notion that judges only exercised their habeas authority in
conformance with a particular conception of liberty collides with Professor Halliday's
data, showing that the only meaningful limit on habeas power was the ability of King's
Bench to force compliance. At first, the Bench invoked the authority of the Crown to
ensure prompt returns and to enforce its ultimate dispositions. As time wore on,
however, the Bench no longer relied upon the Crown for institutional legitimacy. In the
English Civil Wars, King's Bench turned habeas authority against Crown from whence it
sprung. By the time England was at war with the Colonies, the writ reached every judge,
council, court, and jailor; it reached the Crown itself, the Privy Counsel, Justices of the
Peace, specially-commissioned authorities, chartered courts, the military, courts-martial,
ecclesiastical courts, and Parliament. The writ reached naval impressments; it was used
to aid felony process, to adjudicate the custody of slaves, to inspect ecclesiastical orders,
and to decide family custody.
In short, Professor Halliday shows us that the ancestral English form of the Great
Writ was more about what bodies could send and respond to parchment than it was about
vindicating the rights of a prisoner. The essence of habeas was not as a structural
guarantee to secure liberty; it was first and foremost an instrument of aggrandizing,
consolidating, and enforcing judicial power.
ANTEBELLUM FEDERAL POWER
In senses both geographic and chronologic, University of Oklahoma Political
Science Professor Justin Wert picks up the critique of Whiggish history where Professor
Halliday leaves off. Professor Wert scrutinizes the habeas writ in the context of
American constitutional governance. Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution enshrines
the habeas privilege between the clause barring bills of attainder and the clause
specifying rules for "migration and importation" of slaves.'' That unsettling
constitutional sequence is a fitting reflection of the sometimes-ugly intersection of
power, habeas, and liberty in American political history.
Professor Wert fastidiously documents how dominant American political
movements impose paradigms of constitutional governance through habeas law, and he
is at his best when dissecting the period just before the Civil War. 12 Even though
Professor Wert's book is far more than antebellum history, the Taney Court's paradigm
of constitutional governance effectively illustrates my broader point about how habeas
marks boundaries of institutional power. Antebellum habeas became an important tool of
federal supremacy at a time when the Jacksonian political coalition badly needed one,
10. Id at 141.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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and the habeas law was more responsive to that structural objective than to any
principled conception of liberty.
Like most antebellum legal practice, habeas procedure was warped by slavery's
political vortex. The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 provided for extraterritorial capture and
rendition, 13 and a slave-owner needed only a southern-judge-signed affidavit of slave
ownership to commence summary rendition process. 14 The Fugitive Slave Act survived
the Compromise of 1850, enraging northern state electorates and provoking new legal
theories of interposition. 15  In two ways, habeas figured prominently in the post-
Compromise fight over slavery and the corresponding dispute over paradigms of
constitutional governance.
First, federal judges used the habeas writ to stop state imprisonment of U.S.
Marshals that were enforcing the fugitive slave provisions. After 1850, northern states
began arresting federal law enforcement officials - usually U.S. Marshals - that
effected violent recapture. Because the Marshals were enforcing federal law when they
were detained, they successfully invoked the habeas provisions of the 1833 "Force Act"
- originally passed to allow federal tax collectors to remove South Carolina cases to
federal court during the nullification controversy.16 Second, state judges used habeas to
invalidate federal imprisonment of citizens convicted under the fugitive slave provisions.
In 1854, United States Marshal Stephen Ableman arrested abolitionist Sherman Booth
for aiding a fugitive slave's escape to Canada. Aggressively challenging the
constitutionality of the Compromise, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued state habeas
relief to free Booth. The U.S. Supreme Court finally resolved Ableman v. Booth against
Wisconsin four years later, in a famous and intensely nationalistic opinion by Chief
Justice Taney. 17 Among other things, the Court held that federal supremacy prohibited a
state from releasing a federal prisoner.
Antebellum writ practice creates a largely controlled comparison between the use
of federal habeas to challenge state confinement and the use of state habeas to challenge
federal confinement. That symmetry allows Professor Wert to expose just how peripheral
"liberty" was to the development of habeas law during this period. Antebellum habeas
outcomes were a series of political victories for the Jacksonian coalition. Broad federal
and narrow state habeas authorities were each consistent with the Jacksonian paradigm
of constitutional governance, the paradigm with which the Taney Court sympathized.
That governing coalition dissolved at the start of the Civil War, but the nationally
ascendant Republicans had their own reasons for preferring a habeas jurisprudence that
promoted federal supremacy. Professor Wert demonstrates that this story - whereby
habeas law vindicates structural principles of dominant political regimes - repeats itself
throughout American history.
13. See Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 302, 305 (repealed 1864).
14. See WERT, supra note 3, at 54.
15. See Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462, 464 (repealed 1864); WERT, supra note 3, at 62
(describing deterioration of pro-Compromise coalitions in northern states).
16. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57,4 Stat. 632.
17. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 526 (1858).
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Professors Halliday and Wert each show, for different Anglo-American legal eras,
that habeas was as much a means of distributing institutional power as it was a means of
promoting liberty. In Habeas for the Twenty-First Century, Law Professors Nancy King
(Vanderbilt) and Joseph Hoffmann (Indiana) are more concerned with the modem writ's
liberty-securing function. Professors King and Hoffman dutifully canvass the types of
custody for which habeas issues, but the authors' gravity centers over their
groundbreaking study of federal habeas for state prisoners ("Post-Conviction Study
Data"). The results are staggering - for noncapital state prisoners, "the Great Writ is a
pipe dream." 18
Before I discuss the authors' recommendation ("Recommendation"), a brief
historical digression is in order. During the first half of the twentieth century, federal
courts began to use habeas as a remedy for due process violations in state criminal
proceedings. 19 When the Warren Court incorporated new types of constitutional rules
against the states, it used habeas to enforce the evolving concept of due process. Starting
in the 1970s, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts imposed numerous procedural restrictions
on federal habeas relief, including a retroactivity rule, heightened exhaustion
requirements, a procedural default rule largely precluding relief for claims denied on
adequate and independent state grounds, a presumption against federal evidentiary
hearings, and limits on claims asserted in successive petitions.20 In the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress added a one-year statute of
limitations, fortified the presumption against federal evidentiary hearings, and limited
habeas relief to cases involving state decisions that were both erroneous and
unreasonable.21
The Post-Conviction Study Data represents previously unavailable information
about the resources that society expends in reviewing the federal habeas challenges of
state inmates. Professors King and Hoffman also specify a culprit for the system's gross
inefficiency: litigation over procedural defects in non-meritorious petitions. They assert
that the historical object of federal habeas is to deter states from violating the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants.22 They argue that such deterrence is no
longer necessary and that, in any event, federal habeas is an inefficient means to that
end.23 The Recommendation has two planks. The federal habeas plank would strip
federal habeas jurisdiction over state criminal confinement, with exceptions for capital
18. KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 4, at 75.
19. See, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 96 (1923) (holding that a mob-dominated trial violated the
due process rights of the criminal defendant); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915) (expressing
willingness to reach due process questions when a state failed to supply adequate corrective process).
20. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1992); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991)
(new claims in successive petitions); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310-15 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(imposing retroactivity rule); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (creating rule requiring exhaustion of
all claims in a petition); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977) (discussing procedural default
requirements).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (setting statute of limitations); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (imposing substantive limit on
relief); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (creating presumption against evidentiary hearings).
22. See KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 4, at 50-54.
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cases and for habeas claims involving "compelling" showings of innocence. The state
criminal reform plank would create a federal entity to administer grants and to otherwise
improve legal representation in collateral proceedings.
Habeas for the Twenty-First Century merits careful academic consideration, no
matter what I say about the Recommendation. The Post-Conviction Study Data is the
best empirical content in the field, and it will be the starting point for any assessment of
habeas as a form of post-conviction relief The Study Data indeed demonstrates the
central argument advanced by Professors King and Hoffmann - that a commitment to
complicated state and federal habeas procedure is unsustainable. Even in my criticism of
the Recommendation, I question only the federal habeas plank. With respect to the state
criminal reform plank, Professors King and Hoffmann correctly observe that state
criminal and post-conviction representation is abysmal. Any serious attempt to enforce
the constitutional rights of criminal defendants requires society to devote considerably
greater resources to improving representation in state criminal and post-conviction
proceedings.
The Recommendation's federal habeas plank is nonetheless problematic in at least
two respects that I want to highlight here.24 First, the Survey Data does not suggest the
inherent futility of federal habeas relief upon which the Recommendation is premised.
The authors frequently note that only 0.34 percent of noncapital Study Data cases
resulted in relief, but that number refers to cases that were unsuccessful, not necessarily
to those lacking in merit. If the Study Data captures many habeas claims that were
meritorious but unsuccessful - because a federal court denied them either as
procedurally defective or because they challenged a state decision that was not
"unreasonable" error2 5 - then society would want fewer habeas restrictions, not more.
Second, the Recommendation invests heavily in the idea that, because federal
habeas no longer deters state constitutional violations effectively, it should be largely
unavailable to state prisoners. As Professors Halliday and Wert show, however, habeas
corpus was never conceptualized as an instrument of deterrence, even if deterrence was
incident to the writ's raison d'6tre - judicial power. Though Warren-era habeas had a
significant deterrent effect, it does not follow that habeas exists for that purpose. In
Anglo-American legal systems, habeas has primarily been a vehicle for judges to rule on
what kinds of imprisonment were unlawful, and, in America, secondarily as a means of
enforcing federal supremacy.
24. With respect to the federal habeas plank, there are at least two very serious problems that I omit in the
interest of space. First, despite considerable evidence to the contrary, the authors assume without explanation
that elected state judges enforce constitutional rights in criminal cases as aggressively as do their federal
counterparts. Second, they suggest that the Court would use the Suspension Clause to correct state failures to
enforce federal rights of criminal defendants, but the notion that the Supreme Court would clearly use the
Clause to ensure adequate and effective state post-conviction review is almost unthinkable. The Court has
never even held that the Suspension Clause reaches federal criminal convictions. Such an aggressive
Suspension Clause reading is inconsistent with the authors' assumptions about the writ's limited original
function. For a more robust discussion touching on these issues, see John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, &
Keir Weyble, In Defense of Non-capital Habeas: A Response to Hoffman and King, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 435
(2011).
25. This measurement problem is particularly acute because of AEDPA's changes to the substantive
standard for relief. Because AEDPA barred relief for otherwise meritorious challenges where the state decision
was not unreasonable, the volume of meritorious-but-unsuccessful claims in the Study Data is probably
substantial.
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CONCLUSION
In some quarters, support for the idea of stripping federal habeas jurisdiction
enjoys support on the originalist ground that the "appropriate" scope of federal habeas
review must be assessed against a conception of liberty fixed at some time in the past.
Much of the discussion in the last several years, however, has turned to whether such a
narrative has crowded out an equally important story about the writ's role in allocating
power among government institutions-certain courts versus others, judiciaries versus
other branches, and the federal government versus the states.
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